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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
LABOR LA W-Nonemployee Union Organizers Granted 
Access to Company Property £or Solicitation 
Purposes-Solo Cup Company and United 
Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO.* 
Solo Cup Company1 is one of several businesses located in the 
Calumet Industrial District (CID), a privately owned industrial 
park in south Chicago.2 Over ninety-five per cent of Solo's em-
ployees commute to the park by automobile from a large, heavily 
populated metropolitan area.3 A private road which intersects a 
heavily traveled public highway is the only automobile entrance to 
the plant.4 A dispute arose when the CID, pursuant to its rule pro-
hibiting nonemployee solicitation and distribution of literature on 
the park's premises, ejected certain nonemployee union organizers 
who were soliciting along the private road and in the parking areas 
of Solo's plant.6 In the hearing before the NLRB's trial examiner 
the company argued that since the union had alternative means by 
which it could reach the employees, enforcement of a no-solicitation 
rule was justified under the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. 
Babcock & Wilcox Co.6 The union argued that the company's no-
solicitation rule violated section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Rela-
• 172 N.L.R.B. No. llO, 5 CCH 1968 LAB. L. REP. 1f 20,056. Uuly 10, 1968) [here-
inafter principal case]. 
1. Solo employs approximately 280 workers and is engaged in the manufacture 
and sale of paper containers and related products. 
2. The Calumet Industrial District Company (CID) owns the park, which is laid 
out to look like any other industrial area of the city. The trial examiner found that 
the park was a "de facto municipal district." TXD-330-67, at 5 n.3 Gune 15, 1967). 
Improvements include block-long parallel streets, street signs, fire hydrants, and water 
lines. There are no fences or signs denoting the area as private. CID leases roughly 
one-half block of the tract to Solo, including a street and a small parking lot. Other 
employers are located in adjacent blocks. A total of 1,700 employees work in the park. 
Id. at 4-6. 
3. The NLRB found that employee's homes were scattered over an area around the 
plant with a radius of twenty miles, including (in addition to Chicago) the towns of 
Hobart and Whiting, Indiana; and Dalton, Calumet City, and Lansing, Illinois. Over 
4,000,000 people live in this geographical area. Fewer than five % of Solo's employees 
walk or take public transportation to work. Principal case at 3. 
4. The private road is Dorchester Avenue, part of the "common area" in the 
park. It intersects 95th Street, a public road carrying over 12,000 cars per day from 
other plants in the vicinity past this intersection. Principal case at 3 n.l. 
5. The trial examiner found that the CID acted as Solo's agent in enforcing these 
rules. Solo's executives did not personally expel the organizers, but they had agreed 
with officers of the other companies in the park that organizational activity by non-
employees was not to be allowed in the park. TXD-330-67, at 12 Gune 15, 1967). 
6. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964), which reads in part: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer-(!) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed in § 7 .••. " 
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tions Act (NLRA)7 and that it should be allowed to solicit on the 
plant premises because there were no effective alternatives by which 
it could communicate with Solo's employees. To support this con-
tention, the union claimed that it was unable to contact employees 
at home, either personally or by mail, since Solo had refused to fur-
nish a list of the names and addresses of its employees.8 Traffic 
conditions made distribution of literature at the park entrance a 
dangerous alternative.9 Moreover, the union contended that a media 
advertising campaign would be ineffective because the heavily popu-
lated metropolitan area in which Solo's employees lived would make 
resort to any one of a large number of potential media outlets im-
practical.10 The trial examiner, finding that the union had no effec-
tive alternatives for communicating with employees, held that 
Solo's no-solicitation rule violated section S(a)(l). He therefore or-
dered Solo to allow union organizers to solicit in the plant parking 
areas and along the private entrance road. On appeal to the NLRB, 
held, affirmed; a company may not completely exclude nonemployee 
union organizers from its property if there is no effective alternative 
means of communication ·with the employees.11 
The principal case emphasizes the general conflict between an 
employee's right of self-organization under section 7 of the NLRA12 
8. Principal case at 3. A union has no statutory right to an employee list (during 
an organizational drive) although the Board has previously held in Excelsior Under-
wear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), that an employer must make available to the union 
the names and addresses of all employees within seven days after a representation elec-
tion is ordered. See generally Note, The Judicial Role in the Enforcement of the 
"Excelsior Rule", 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1292 (1968); note 59 infra. 
9. Although there is a stop sign for Dorchester Avenue traffic at the intersection, 
the fact that cars tum both left and right onto 95th Street, coupled with the large 
volume of traffic, make it a dangerous point at which to distribute literature. Principal 
case at 2-3. The trial examiner found that although there were three possible en-
trances to the park, over 95% of all employees entered by automobile at the Dorchester 
Avenue entrance. TXD-330-67, at 6 Gune 15, 1967). 
10. Principal case at 3. In a large urban area serviced by many radio and TV sta• 
tions as well as several newspapers, it is almost impossible for a union trying to con-
tact a small number of workers to decide on the most appropriate media to use. 
Another problem is that the cost of being certain that its message will reach the 
employees may be prohibitive. Even assuming that finances were available and that 
the union was able successfully to choose the proper media, one must question the 
effectiveness of this type of communication. See Gould, The Question of Union Ac-
tivity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. R.Ev. 73, 102-03 (1964). See also notes 15-17 
infra and accompanying text. 
11. The NLRB's opinion stated: "[W]e find that [Solo's] exclusion of union orga-
nizers from the premises of the industrial park and its enforcement of a no-distribu-
tion rule was violative of Section 8(a)(I) of the Act, in view of the inaccessibility of 
employees to reasonable union efforts to communicate with them." Principal case at 5. 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964): "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations .••• " It has long been recognized that the 
§ 7 rights include the "full freedom to receive aid, advice and information from 
others, concerning those rights and their enjoyment," Harlan Fuel Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 25, 
32 (1938), and that "others" includes union organizers as well as fellow employees. 
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944). It has even been stated that the right of workers 
to organize freely is as important as the right of free speech. Jefferson Elec. Co. v. 
NLRB, 102 F.2d 949, 956 (7th Cir. 1939); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). 
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and the employer's right, as a property owner, to control access to 
his plant premises.13 Face-to-face contact14 between employees and 
trained union organizers15 at the workplace16 would undoubtedly be 
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock &: Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1956). The tradi-
tional focus of this conflict has been to define the rights of the employer and the 
union. However, it should be noted that it is the employee who is the real party in 
interest; the decisions ultimately determine his rights-who may speak to him, what 
may be said, where it may be said, and how it may be communicated. The union's 
rights arc therefore secondary because they derive in large part from the employee's 
primary right to organize. 
14. It is generally agreed that face-to-face solicitation is the most desirable means of 
communication for organizational purposes. See generally Gould, The Question of 
Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73, 102-03 (1964). See NLRB 
v. S. &: H. Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1967), quoting NLRB v. United 
Aircraft, 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964): 
[T]he predictable alternatives [to personal contacts] bear without exception the 
flaws of greater expense and effort, and a lower degree of effectiveness. Mailed 
material would be typically lost in the daily flood of printed matter which passes 
with little impact from mailbox to wastebasket. Television and radio appeals, 
where not precluded entirely by cost, would suffer from competition with the 
family's favorite program and at best would not compare with personal solici-
tation. Newspaper advertisements are subject to similar objections. 
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1241 n.10 (1966), the NLRB noted: 
[A] union that does know the names or addresses of some of the voters may seek 
to communicate with them by distributing literature on sidewalks or street 
corners adjoining the employer's premises or by utilizing the mass media ..•. 
The likelihood that all employees will be reached by these methods is, however, 
problematical at best. [Emphasis in the original]. 
See also Note, Labor Law-NLRB Regulation of Employer's Pre-Election Captive 
Audience Speeches, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1236, 1245 (1967). 
15. Although it is usually assumed by the courts that employees who arc union 
adherents can adequately carry on organizational work, it is evident that only a 
limited amount of this type of work can be done in nonworking periods. In a large 
plant the physical problems involved in communicating with all the employees may 
be insuperable. While some organization work can be done by employees who are 
willing to solicit fellow employees, it is obvious that, lacking as they do the requisite 
special training and experience, they cannot convey the union's appeal with anything 
like the effectiveness of professional union organizers. NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 
324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963). 
For the proposition that employees need outside counsel in order adequately to ex-
ercise their rights of self-organization, see authority cited in Note, "Not as a Stranger": 
Nonemployee Union Organizers Soliciting on Company Property, 65 YALE L.J. 423, 
427 n.32 (1956). 
16. In NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963), the court 
stated: 
The chances are negligible that alternatives equivalent to solicitation in the plant 
itself would exist. In the plant the entire work force may be contacted by a rela-
tively small number of employees with little expense. The solicitors have the 
opportunity for personal confrontation, so that they can present their message 
with maximum persuasiveness. 
Although this case dealt with employee organizers, the point is applicable to non-
employee organizers as well. As one commentator has described the situation: 
I do not believe that one can seriously speak of adequate or effective communi-
cations where the union must go to the workers, through any means, who are 
spread out in the cities, suburbs, or rural areas. The union is put to a hollow 
gesture when it must compete over television in, for instance, the New York-
New Jersey area, for the votes of a very small portion of that population. 
Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REv. 73, 
102-03 (1964). "The idea that personal contacts at home suffice for organizing em-
ployees • • • is totally unrealistic. • • • [I]t must be recognized that policies which 
relegate the union to ringing doorbells may cause irritating, though not usually tech-
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the most effective way for the union to impart organizational infor-
mation to the employees. But this assumption overlooks the legiti-
mate interests of the employer; to permit organizational activities in 
all parts of the plant at any time would be unduly destructive of both 
plant production and discipline and could result in the employer's 
underwriting, at least to some extent, the union's organizational cam-
paign.17 The courts, pursuant to their duty to balance these conflict-
ing interests, 18 have held that union organizers who are employees 
may orally solicit in any area of the plant during nonworking periods 
and may distribute literature in nonworking areas during nonwork-
ing hours.19 The Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Babcock & 
nical, invasions of individual privacy." Id. at 99. In May Dept. Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 
797, 802 (1962), reversed, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963), the NLRB noted: 
The place of work is the one place where all employees involved are sure to be 
together. Thus it is the one place where they can all discuss with each other 
the advantages and disadvantages of the organization and lend each other sup-
port and , encouragement. Such full discussion lies at the very heart of the orga-
nizational rights guaranteed by the Act, and is not to be restricted, except as the 
exigencies of production, discipline and order demand. 
The Board in the May case concluded that by excluding union organizers from the 
workplace, the company had relegated the union "to relatively catch-as-catch-can 
methods of rebuttal, such as home visits, advertised meetings on the emloyees' own 
time, telephone calls, letters, and the various media .•.• " See also Plant City Welding 
& Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131 (1957); Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953); NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 
F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963); Gale Prods., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963). 
17. Employer "underwriting" of the organizational drive would occur only if the 
nonemployee organizers were allowed to speak to or distribute literature to the em• 
ployees during work periods. Any work time so used would of course be paid for by 
the employer. In-plant solicitation by nonemployee union organizers during unpaid 
nonworking periods-lunch hours or other meal breaks-cannot really be regarded in 
the same way. However, if employees are paid for this time, or for other nonworking 
periods such as coffee breaks, permitting solicitation by nonemployees arguably 
amounts to a subsidy of the organizational campaign by the employer. On the other 
hand, it is possible to argue that such paid nonworking time is still the employees' 
own time, and that permitting solicitation during these periods is not an undue im-
position on the employer. Cf. the recognized rights of those who are employees to 
conduct organizational activity, notes 18-20 infra and accompanying text. See NLRB 
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955) (NLRB cannot impose a 
"servitude" on an employer when no employee is directly involved in solicitation, aff'd, 
351 U.S. 105 (1956), NLRB v. Seampruffe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1955) [nonem-
ployee organizers are "strangers to the right of self-organization, absent a showing of non-
accessibility amounting to a handicap to self-organization" (emphasis added)]. 
18. See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956); NLRB v. LeTourneau 
Co., 324 U.S. 793 (1944). 
19. See Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967); Republic Avia-
tion Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 225 F.2d 16 (9th 
Cir. 1955); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 
(5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 301 (1945). For the Board's current formulation 
of employee distribution and solicitation rules, see Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 
N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). Cf. Republic Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 
1967). See Note, No-Solicitation and No-Distribution Rules: Presumptive Validity and 
Discrimination, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049 (1964). Employees of department stores are 
treated somewhat differently because of the public nature of the business. See Mont• 
gomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965); 13onwit Teller, Inc. v. 
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Wilcox Co.,20 however, made it clear that nonemployee organizers do 
not enjoy the same rights. 
In Babcock nonemployee organizers were prohibited from hand-
ing out literature at the workplace when the employer enforced a 
no-distribution rule that was nondiscriminatory in the sense that 
other kinds of solicitation by nonemployees were also banned on the 
premises. The union alleged that because of dangerous traffic con-
ditions at the plant entrance and the company's failure to provide a 
list of employees' names and addresses, there were no satisfactory 
alternative means of reaching the employees. Therefore, the union 
argued, nonemployee organizers should be granted access to the 
plant. The Supreme Court rejected this argument; it found that the 
plant was located near a small community of 21,000 people, that all 
the employees lived within a thirty-mile radius of the workplace, and 
that the employees were known by the organizers. The Court de-
cided that such proximity would make normal means of publicity21 
adequate and concluded that the union's nonemployee organizers 
should not be allowed access to the plant. 
In reaching this decision, the Court enunciated the rule that an 
employer can deny nonemployee organizers access to his property so 
long as reasonable alternative channels of communication with the 
employees are available, and so long as the employer's no-distribu-
tion or no-solicitation rule is enforced in a nondiscriminatory man-
ner. 22 The Court emphasized the fundamental distinction between 
employee and nonemployee organizers.23 While an employer cannot 
restrict his employees' right to discuss self-organization at the work-
place unless such limitations are necessary to maintain production 
or plant discipline, a nonemployee is a stranger to the plant and has 
NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953); May Dept. Stores 
Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enf. denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963); Great Atl. &: 
Pac. Tea Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 747 (1959); Marshall Field&: Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952). 
20. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
21. In this case the Court used the words "normal means" to mean the local news-
paper, personal visits, handbills sent to individual employees, and use of the local 
radio stations. In contrast, the NLRB had held that the plant was so much more 
effective a place for communication of organizational information that it had allowed 
the union access to the parking lot and sidewalk in its decision in the Babcock case. 
109 NL.R.B. 485, 486 (1954). 
22. 351 U.S. at ll2: 
[A]n employer may validly post his property against non-employee distribution 
of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available 
channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message 
and if the employer's notice or order does not discriminate against the union by 
allowing other distribution. 
23. 351 U.S. at II3 (emphasis added): 
The distinction is one of substance. No restriction may be placed on the em-
ployees' right to discuss self-organization among themselves unless the employer 
can demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or disci-
pline. But no such obligation is owed to non-employee organizers. Their access 
to company property is governed by a diflerent consideration. 
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no right to be on the property. For this reason, he is prima facie 
excluded from the premises. However, since the employees' "right 
to self-organization depends in some measure on their ability to 
learn the advantages of self-organization from others," this exclu-
sionary presumption is not conclusive.24 A nonemployee's right to 
come onto the employer's premises for organizational purposes is 
directly related to the impact on the employees of the organizer's 
exclusion.25 By this rationale, the Babcock rule allows the nonem-
ployee organizer to solicit on company property only in those situa-
tions in which it is unreasonably difficult for him to communicate 
with the employees in other ways.26 
Although the literal language of Babcock states that the alterna-
tives available to the nonemployee organizers must be "effective,"27 
the courts have interpreted the word "effective" to mean only that an 
alternative exists;28 "effectiveness" in the practical sense of the word 
has not been a consideration.29 Thus, nonemployee organizers 
24. 351 U.S. at 113. 
25. See note 27 infra. 
26. 351 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added): "Consequently, if the location of the plant 
and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of 
reasonable efforts to communicate with them, the employer must allow the union to 
approach the employees on his property." See also Textile Workers v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 
896 (2d Cir. 1967). 
27. 351 U.S. at 112 (emphasis added): 
fT]he union may not always insist that the employer aid organization. • • • 
[W]hen the inaccessibility of employees make ineffective the reasonable attempts 
by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the 
right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the extent needed 
to permit communication of information on the right to organize. 
28. See note 31 infra. See also NLRB v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 271 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 
1959), where the court upheld a broad, employee no-distribution rule because the 
employer had valid reasons and because the union had alternative methods of com-
munication (burden on employer to justify rule is less if union has other means 
available); Republic Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1967) (employee 
attempted to distribute literature on his off-shift to another shift of employees; held, 
company can enforce no-distribution rule against him unless union proves no alterna-
tive means of communication are available); NLRB v. Cranston Print ,vorks Co., 258 
F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1958) (employee, injured and on extended leave, attempted to dis-
tribute literature in parking lot with non-employee organizers; held, one who aids 
the commission of trespass is also guilty; employee on leave has lesser rights than do 
current employees); NLRB v. Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1960) 
(employees of multi-store bargaining unit may not solicit in nonwork areas of stores 
other than their own). 
29. For the NLRB's prior exposition of the Babcock rule, see Walton l\Ifg. Co., 126 
N.L.R.B. 697, 698 (1960): 
[R]ules which prohibit union solicitation or distribution of union literature by 
non-employee union organizers at any time on the employer's property are pre-
sumptively valid, in the absence of a showing that the union cannot reasonably 
reach the employees with its message in any other way, or a showing that the em-
ployer's notice discriminates against the union by allowing other solicitation or 
distribution. 
See G. C. Murphy Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1968); Bonnie Foods, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 
No. 27 (1968). Cf. NLRB v. United Steelworkers [Nutone], 357 U.S. 357, 363 (1958), 
where the Court stated that in determining whether access was to be granted, the 
employer's no-solicitation and no-distribution rules should be analyzed to see if they 
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typically have been given access to company property only in those 
extreme situations in which contact with the employees outside the 
plant area was virtually impossible.3° For instance, access has been 
granted when the facts revealed that the workplace was a "company 
town" or an isolated lumber camp.31 In short, Babcock has been very 
narrowly construed to operate as a conclusive presumption that the 
union has a "reasonable" alternative so long as there is any oppor-
tunity, however limited, for contact with the employees. 
Given this interpretation of Babcock, the Solo Cup decision rep-
resents a significant attempt by the NLRB to expand the rights of 
unions to conduct organizational campaigns with nonemployees. It 
seems that the Board intended such an expansion since it could have 
disposed of the case on several narrower grounds without reaching 
the issue of the effectiveness of the alternative means of communica-
tion open to the union. First, the evidence was clear that the no-dis-
tribution rule in effect at the time of the organizers' expulsion was 
applied only to union organizational activity and was therefore 
discriminatory.32 Previous NLRB decisions in similar cases have 
granted organizers access to an employer's property as a remedy for 
such a violation;33 indeed, this was the alternative holding in the 
"truly diminished the ability of the labor unions involved to carry their message to 
the employees." See generally Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A 
Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEO. L.J. 266 (1958); Note, No-Solicitation and No-
Distribution Rules: Presumptive Validity and Discrimination, ll2 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 
1049, 1058-65 (1964); Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Reme-
dies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1258-64 (1963); Note, "Not As a 
Stranger": Non-Employee Union Organizers Soliciting on Company Property, 65 YALE 
L.J. 423 (1956). 
30. NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1948) (orga-
nization would be "seriously handicapped"). 
31. See NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); Harlan Fuel Co., 
8 N.L.R.B. 25 (1938); West Kentucky Coal Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 88 (1938); Weyer-
hauser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258 (1941); Ozan Lumber Co., 42 N.L.R.B. 1073 
(1942); W. T. Carter, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950). A recent decision allowing non-
employee organizers access to the premises of an isolated resort hotel to contact em-
ployees is NLRB v. S. & H. Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967). Compare 
these cases with Associated Dry Goods Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 271 (1953), and Mooresville 
Mills, 99 N.L.R.B. 572 (1952), where organizers were not allowed access because it was 
found they could solicit at or near a plant entrance. See also Marshall Field & Co., 
98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), enf. denied, 200 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1952). For a discussion of 
these early cases (and union organization on company property generally), see Hanley, 
Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. 
L.J. 266 (1958). 
32. The NLRB found that various vendors, solicitors for charities, and employee 
groups were allowed on the premises. Principal case at 4. Even while expelling the 
organizers, CID made no mention of a general rule, but said only that union activity 
was not permitted. After several other union attempts to distribute literature, CID 
filed criminal trespass charges against one organizer who was subsequently arrested. 
TXD-330-67, at 12 ijune 15, 1967). 
33. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); NLRB v. Stowe 
Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 
1961); Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); Bonwit Teller, 
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Solo Cup case.34 Second, in determining that Solo Cup's no-distribu-
tion and no-solicitation rules were applied discriminatorily, the 
NLRB found that the CID was a "quasi-public" area.35 It based this 
finding on the fact that the CID was indistinguishable from other 
industrial areas of Chicago; there were no fences, signs, or guards to 
indicate that it was private. Moreover, no one except union or-
ganizers had ever been excluded from the park. In light of these 
facts, the NLRB concluded that Solo could not "deny access to 
the premises to union representatives, whether it be for picketing 
or handbilling."36 This finding could also have been dispositive of 
the case. Third, under the authority of J.P. Stevens and Co.,37 the 
Board could have disposed of the case merely by requiring Solo to 
furnish the union with a list of employee names and addresses.38 
Under the usual interpretation of Babcock, such a list would have 
provided the union with a reasonable alternative and no inquiry 
as to the effectiveness of personal visits to the employees' homes or 
of a mailing or telephone campaign would have been required.39 
However, the NLRB did not fully rely on any of these three poten-
tial grounds for decision in its opinion.40 Instead, it chose to em-
Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953); People v. 
Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961). Cf. Serv-Air, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 57 CCH Lab. Cas. ,I 12,425 (10th Cir. 1968). See Note, No-Solicitation 
and No-Distribution Rules: Presumptive Validity and Discrimination, 112 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1049, 1058-65 (1964). 
34. Principal case at 5, 5 CCH 1968 LAB. L. REP. at 25,145. 
35. Principal case at 4, 5 CCH 1968 LAB. L. REP. at 25,144. The NLRB analogized 
the situation to that present in Amalgamated Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. 
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), where nonemployee union men were 
allowed access to a private shopping center to picket a single supermarket. See notes 
48-56 infra and accompanying text. 
36. Principal case at 4, 5 CCH 1968 LAB. L. REP. at 25,144. Cf. Cranston Print 
Works Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1834 (1957), and General Dynamics Telecommunications, 137 
N.L.R.B. 1725 (1962), where the plants were fenced off and rules prohibiting solicita-
tion and distribution of literature by nonemployees were impartially enforced. Gen-
eral Dynamics involved a private road open to general public use; however, the union 
was denied use of it for distribution because it was not "public" enough. Note that pick-
eting has a qualified first amendment status, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 
(1940). 
37. 167 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 5 CCH 1968 LAB. L. REP. ,I 21,740, enforced in part, 59 
CCH Lab. Cas. ,I 13,172 (4th Cir. 1968). 
38. Enforcement of a similar remedy was refused in another case involving J. P. 
Stevens & Co. [Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (1967), cert. denied, 37 
U.S.L.W. 3134 (Oct. 15, 1968)], but this case, like the others involving the Stevens com-
pany, involved massive unfair labor practices by the employer, and the Board has 
adhered to its position U, P. Stevens&: Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 5 CCH 1968 LAB. L. 
REP. ,I 22,565 (1968)] on the basis of the Fourth Circuit decision supra. In the principal 
case the Board did order Solo to give the union an address list, but the list was only 
part of the remedy. 
39. See Phillips Mfg. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1420 (1964); Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 
697, 698 (1960). 
40. These possible alternative grounds, however, provide a reviewing court of ap-
peals with several rationales for upholding the result in Solo Cup without passing on 
the merits of the NLRB's renewed interest in the actual effectiveness of the means of 
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phasize the physical conditions of metropolitan Chicago as they 
related to the effectiveness of the nonemployee organizers' cam-
paign.41 
The NLRB apparently has recognized that the phrase "reason-
able alternatives" includes not only a simple "is communication 
possible" analysis, but also an examination of particular alternative 
means of contact to see if they are effective in a practical sense. In 
addition to physical accessibility, this appraisal of alternatives would 
include consideration of such factors as the financial feasibility of 
organizational activity and the safety with which it can be carried on. 
Thus, in Solo Cup, hazardous traffic conditions made solicitation at 
the park entrance impossible. But even if traffic conditions had not 
been dangerous, the inability of organizers to distinguish Solo em-
ployees from the I, 700 other workers in the CID would have made 
solicitation at the park entrance impractical. A media advertising 
campaign, though possible, would also have been impractical because 
of the dispersal of employees throughout a large metropolitan area 
with many potential media outlets. Also, the fact that the union 
had no employee list was considered relevant. Thus the fact that the 
NLRB granted access in spite of the possibility of contact implies 
that a more expansive view of the reasonableness of alternatives will 
replace the older "impossibility" test.42 
The implication that the Board is attempting to modify the rule 
is reinforced by the fact that periodically over the past twenty years 
it has tried to incorporate an analysis of the practical effectiveness 
of alleged alternatives into the tests of nonemployee organizational 
rights.43 On several occasions, the NLRB has even attempted to 
equate the rights of nonemployee and employee organizers.44 The 
courts have considered these attempts unresponsive both to legiti-
mate distinctions benveen employees and nonemployees and to the 
communication left open to the union if its nonemployee organizers are excluded from 
the employer's property. For example, it would be possible for the court of appeals to 
enforce the NLRB's order in Solo Cup by adopting only the finding of discrimination 
in enforcement of the no-solicitation rule. 
41. See notes 64-67 infra and accompanying text. 
42. See notes 27, 30, 31 supra. It can be argued that since the Court in Babcock 
did talk in terms of effectiveness, the NLRB is merely following its mandate; under 
this interpretation, the real disagreement is between the NLRB and the courts of 
appeal about how to construe Babcock. 
43. See, e.g., Caldwell Furniture Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1501 (1952): F. W. Woolworth 
Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953); Seampruffe, Inc. (Holdenville Plant), 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 
en/. denied, 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), afj'd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956); The Babcock &: 
Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485 (1954), enf. denied, 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), affd, 
351 U.S. 105 (1956); Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954); The May Dept. Stores Co., 
136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enf. denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). 
44. See. e.g., Le Tourneau Co. of Georgia, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, enf. denied, 143 F.2d 
67 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 324 U.S. 793 (1944); Seampruffe, Inc. (Holdenville plant), 109 
N.L.R.B. 24, en/. denied, 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1958), affd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
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owner's right to control access to his property.45 However, in decid-
ing Solo Cup, the Board chose a case which fits the literal language 
of Babcock and is similar to that case except with regard to the facts 
bearing on the effectiveness of the alternative means of communica-
tion open to the union.46 If affirmed on the ground that the union's 
alternatives were not "effective," Solo Cup will be a key precedent 
permitting the NLRB to examine more closely the practical prob-
lems connected with this phase of union organizational campaigns.47 
45. In the early 1950's the NLRB relied on NLRB v. LeTourneau Co., 324 U.S. 
793 (1944), to narrow the gap between employees and nonemployees. In that case the 
Supreme Court had overruled a court of appeals' holding that there was "no provi-
sion, express or implied, in the National Labor Relations Act which requires an em-
ployer to permit organization efforts on his premises .••• " 143 F.2d 67, 68 (5th Cir. 1944). 
Although LeTourneau dealt only with employees, it was widely believed to apply to non-
employees also. See Caldwell Furniture Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1501, enforced, 199 F.2d 267 (4th 
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953) (rule prohibiting nonemployee distribution in-
valid in absence of special circumstances since it would "constitute an unreasonable im-
pediment to the freedom of communication essential to the exercise of its employees rights 
to self-organization'); Carolina Mills, 92 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1168-69 (1951); F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953). In 1952 the NLRB introduced its "equality" 
theory (employees have the "right to hear both sides of the story under circumstances 
which reasonably approximate equality'') in Bonwit Teller, 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 612 (1951), 
enf. denied, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953). See also Bilt-
more Mfg., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951), where this doctrine was extended to industrial 
situations. 
This trend culminated in Seampruffe, Inc. (Holdenville Plant), 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 32 
(1954), enf. denied, 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), affd, 351 U.S. 105 (1956), where 
the Board stated that distinguishing between employees and nonemployees "would 
be a differentiation not only without substance but in clear defiance of the rationale 
given by the Board and the courts for permitting solicitation." This case was overruled 
by the Supreme Court at the same time it decided Babcock. 
In 1962, the NLRB seemed to be using almost a presumption that methods other 
than at-the-site contact were ineffective. The May Dept. Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 
797 (1962), enf. denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963). In that case the store had a 
broad, privileged no-solicitation rule, but made anti-union speeches on company time 
and property without allowing the union a chance to reply. The NLRB found a 
"glaring imbalance" in opportunity, but was criticized by the court of appeals for not 
making findings as to other methods of communication open to the union instead of 
summarily treating "all methods of communication other than a working-time speech 
to employees as 'catch-as-catch-can,' ineffective methods." 316 F.2d at 800. However, 
the court passed over the fact that the traditional rule assumes conclusively that the 
alternatives are effective. Cf. NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945); NLRB 
v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941); Richfield Oil Co. v. NLRB, 143 
F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1944), all of which contain the suggestion that nonemployee rights 
should not be confused with employee rights. 
46. That is, the size of the metropolitan area in which the plant was located, the 
dangerous traffic conditions, and the refusal to supply an employee list. 
47. Although Babcock has been construed by the courts to include only the first 
concept of effectiveness discussed above (focusing on whether communication is possi-
ble), its language leaves open the possibility of analyzing the relative effectiveness 
of alleged alternative channels of communication. See note 27 supra; Note, "Not as a 
Stranger": Non-Employee Union Organizers Soliciting on Company Property, 65 YALE 
L.J. 423, 426-27 (1956). Also, the Supreme Court in Babcock left "[t]he determination 
of the proper adjustments" of organizational and property rights to the NLRB. "Its 
rulings, when reached on findings of fact supported by substantial evidence on the 
record as a whole, should be sustained by the courts unless its conclusions rest on 
erroneous legal foundations." 351 U.S. at 112. The NLRB in Solo Cup would appear 
to have satisfied these conditions. 
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Another aspect of the Board's decision which may have impor-
tant implications is its discussion of the industrial park as a "quasi-
public" area.48 Industrial parks are increasingly popular with plant 
owners in all parts of the country; as the NLRB noted, their de-
velopment poses some of the same problems of access with which the 
courts have already dealt in cases involving picketing in shopping 
centers. The Board analogized the CID, which it termed a "de facto 
municipal district," to these shopping center cases, citing the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Food Employee's Local 590 v. Logan 
Valley Plaza.49 In Logan Valley, the Court held that, since the area 
was "quasi-public," nonemployee union members could not be barred 
from picketing a supermarket located in a privately owned shopping 
center. The Court based its decision on the finding that the roads 
and sidewalks of the plaza were the "functional equivalents" of those 
in a normal municipal business district. Moreover, they were "freely 
accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing 
through." Therefore, those members of the public wishing to exer-
cise first amendment rights "in a manner and for a purpose generally 
consonant with the use to which the property is actually put" could 
not be wholly excluded.50 
It is significant that in Logan Valley, the Court quoted Marsh v. 
A labama51 to the effect that "the more an owner, for his own advan-
tage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the 
more do his [ownership] rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it."52 Because of the 
use of this language, Logan Valley cannot be distinguished from 
Solo Cup on the grounds that the former case involved picketing 
that was protected activity under the first amendment. Quite apart 
from any arguments that the distribution of organizational literature 
should also be protected under the first amendment, 53 the nonem-
ployee organizers in Solo Cup were on the employer's property in 
order to provide information to the employees about their statutory 
right of self-organization.54 
In Logan Valley the Court was concerned with the possibility 
that the rights of the picketers could turn on the fortuity of the 
physical location of the property. Thus, the mere fact that a store is 
located in a shopping center instead of on a street corner where 
48. See notes 35 & 36 supra and accompanying text. 
49. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). 
50. 391 U.S. at 319-20 (emphasis added). 
5 l. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
52. 391 U.S. at 325, quoting 326 U.S. at 506. 
53. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); 
American Fedn. of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Woodward, 37 U.S.L.W. 
2421 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); 
Jefferson Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 102 F.2d. 949 (7th Cir. 1939). But cf. Breard v. City of 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 662 (1951). 
54. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
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picketing would otherwise be permissible should not insulate the 
store owner from those wishing to exercise first amendment rights. 55 
The same analysis applies to an industrial park. Union handbilling 
or picketing activity, which would be permissible on public property 
immediately adjacent to a plant located on a single lot, could be 
effectively prohibited if that same plant were located in an indus-
trial park which strictly enforces nondiscriminatory no-distribution 
and no-solicitation rules. If the traffic situation at the park entrance 
or entrances is hazardous, as was the case in Solo Cup, the union 
might be prevented from carrying on organizational activity alto-
gether. 
However, despite this similarity between industrial parks--at 
least, parks that are set up in the same manner as the CID-and 
shopping centers, it is submitted that the NLRB would be unwise 
to extend its quasi-public-property analysis to the more typical in-
dustrial park. The key consideration in deciding whether an area is 
"quasi-public" in nature is whether an element of wholesale invita-
tion-that is, unlimited accessibility-is extended to the public at 
large.56 In the case of a shopping center, such a broad invitation to 
the public exists by definition. On the other hand, most industrial 
parks are not only fenced off, but are expected to be used only by 
employees and related business personnel; no element of unlimited 
accessibility is intended. Even the CID, which was unusual in the 
sense that it was not fenced off and gave the appearance of being a 
common area, was not intended for use by the public at large. For 
this reason, the Logan Valley concept of quasi-public property, as in-
terpreted in Solo Cup, should not be read to create a separate test 
for the appropriateness of granting access to nonemployee organizers. 
Rather, the finding that an area is quasi-public should be considered 
merely as a corollary to the question of whether there has been 
discriminatory enforcement of the no-distribution and no-solicitation 
rules.57 ~ead in this manner, the NLRB's holding in the principal 
case would be consistent with existing authority since the normal 
remedy when the Board finds that a no-solicitation rule has been 
enforced discriminatorily is to allow access to the employer's prop-
erty.58 
55. 391 U.S. at 324-25. 
56. See generally Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of Quasi-
Public Property, 49 MINN. L. R.Ev. 505 (1965). One court has suggested a test to decide 
when a piece of property may validly be described as quasi-public. See Freeman v. 
Retail Clerk's Union, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 432, 363 P.2d 803, 806 (1961) (the "trespasser" 
must be allowed access where the alternatives would be "unrealistic or impractical to 
the point where there exists a serious restriction upon the trespasser's ability to com-
municate as effectively as would naturally and normally be expected, were legal title 
to reside in the public.'') 
57. See notes 35 and 36 supra and accompanying text. 
58. See notes 22, 29, 33 supra and accompanying text. 
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This, however, does not mean that because a plant is located in 
an industrial park instead of on a street corner its owner will 
be able to bar union organizers at will. On the contrary, location of 
a plant in an industrial park is a factor to be analyzed in determining 
whether "effective" communication alternatives are available to the 
union. If hazardous traffic conditions surrounding an industrial park 
make solicitation unsafe or if organizers are unable to distinguish 
among workers leaving the park, the Board should find that solicita-
tion at the park entrance is an ineffective alternative. If an analysis 
of other alternatives, such as an advertising campaign, shows that no 
other effective channel of communication exists, access to some part 
of the park would be justified.59 The question remains how much 
59. By implication, Solo Cup suggests that where employees are widely scattered 
or the plant employs a large number of workers, the NLRB will not find the 
mere giving of an employee list sufficient (see text accompanying notes 37-42 supra), 
especially in crowded, urban areas. But it is arguable that a list might suffice in 
smaller communities or where a very small number of employees was involved. The 
union has no statutory right to an employee list, although the NLRB does require a 
company to give the union a list within seven days after a representation election has 
been announced. See note 8 supra. See also Gimbell Bros., 147 N.L.R.B. 500 (1964). 
In Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), the NLRB stated that an 
employer's refusal to disclose such a list, "regardless of the existence of alternative 
channels of communication, tends to interfere with a fair and free election." 156 
N.L.R.B. at 1246. However, the Board specifically noted that this procedure would 
not be used for an initial organization effort, although admitting than an employer 
has "no siguificant interest" in the secrecy of employee names and addresses. 156 
N.L.R.B. at 1243. The "Excelsior rule" was promulgated to provide a partial solution 
to the captive audience problem. In general industrial situations the NLRB has not 
allowed unions equal time to reply to employer captive audience speeches. General 
Elcc. Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966). A policy of allowing the union reasonable access 
to the plant parking lot for a short period prior to an election would also help allevi• 
ate many of the problems created by a captive audience speech. See Bok, The Regula-
tion of Compaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38 (1964). Compare The May Dept. Stores Co., 136 
N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), en/. denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963), with Livingston Shirt 
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953). See also Comment, Dilemma in Labor Law: The Right 
To Own T'ersus the Right To Know, 5 DUQUESNE L. REv. 77 (1966); Note, Labor Law 
-The Judicial Role in the Enforcement of the "Excelsior'' Rule, 66 MICH. L. REv. 
1292 (1968). The NLRB can also order that the union be given a list as part of its 
powers under § lO(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964), to remedy other unfair 
labor practices. See J. P. Stevens Co., 167 N.L.R.B. No. 37, CCH 1968 NLRB Dec. 
,I 21,741 (Aug. 31, 1968); Marlene Indus. Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 58, CCH 1967 NLRB 
Dec. 1J 21,629 (1967). In regard to § I0(c), see Recent Decision, Labor Law-NLRB May 
Order Employees To Give Union Equal Time To Reply to "Captive Audience" 
Speeches Only If Employer ls Enforcing a No-solicitation Rule, 35 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 1095 (1967); Note, Remedies for Employer Unfair Labor Practices During Union 
Organizing Campaign, 77 YALE L.J. 1574 (1968). 
The Solo Cup decision does, however, appear to leave unanswered an important 
question: if an employer barred all nonemployees from his premises, thereby avoiding 
a finding of discrimination, and if he was willing to give the union an employee list, 
could he then prevent any access to his property? Pre-Solo Cup doctrine would answer 
this question in the affirmative; however, if Solo Cup truly means that the NLRB is 
willing to examine alternatives closely, perhaps it could find that merely supplying 
an employee list when the workers are dispersed over a large urban area is not an 
effective alternative. 
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access should be granted consistent with the employer's legitimate 
property interests.60 It seems clear that nonemployees, if allowed on 
the property, should not be given the same privileges as regular em-
ployees. 61 Because nonemployee organizers would be strangers to the 
plant, they would probably be unfamiliar with the location of work-
ing and nonworking areas; admitting them to the plant would in-
volve problems of identification, discipline, general plant security, 
theft, and risk of injury to themselves and others. For these reasons 
an employer would seem to have a legitimate interest in denying 
them access to the working areas of the plant. However, the same 
considerations do not control such areas as parking lots and access 
roads. The most equitable solution in terms of all the interests in-
volved would be to open these areas to nonemployee organizers, 
with reasonable regulation as to time of solicitation and number of 
organizers present, whenever there are no other effective channels of 
contact with the workers.62 If justified by plant production needs or 
by discipline problems, an employer would still have the right, as he 
has with regard to his own employees, 63 to enforce more stringent 
rules. 
Solo Cup, if affirmed on the ground discussed above, could have 
far-reaching implications. Most plants in large metropolitan areas 
employ workers who commute to work from a wide area and can-
not easily be reached in person or by mass media. Traffic conditions 
in a crowded industrial or commercial area often make it dangerous 
to distribute literature at a plant entrance.64 And in any situation 
involving an industrial park, an organizer cannot readily distinguish 
among automobiles driven by employees whom he wishes to con-
tact and those driven by other employees in the park. Moreover, the 
union has no statutory right to an employee list, thereby often pre-
cluding any contact at the employees' homes.65 These considerations, 
coupled with the fact that most unions are located in urban areas, 
indicate that Solo Cup could potentially affect a great number of 
employees. 66 
60. The Court in Babcock left "[t]he determination of the proper adjustment" of 
property rights and organizational rights to the NLRB. 351 U.S. at 112. 
61. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
62. The NLRB allowed the union access to this kind of plant area as part of the 
general remedy in Solo Cup. 
63. See NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
376 U.S. 951 (1964); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 849 (1962); 
Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1242, enforced, 210 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1953), 
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954); Peyton Packing Co., Inc., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943). 
64. Certainly, even given ideal traffic conditions, any kind of a solicitation con-
versation is virtually impossible at a plant entrance where all the workers leave or 
enter in autos. 
65. See notes 38 8e 59 supra and accompanying text. 
66. Solo Cup suggests that the NLRB must proceed on a case-by-case basis, at least 
until it obtains enough data on what is or is not effective communication; then, it 
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The employee has a right to hear both sides in an organizational
campaign-perhaps not under strictly equal conditions, but as one
court has phrased it, under conditions in which the union has "at
least as great" a chance of reaching the employee with its presenta-
tion as does the employer with his "ability to promote the legally
authorized expression of his anti-union views. '0 7 Viewed in this light,
the NLRB's decision in Solo Cup to permit organizers limited access
to company property in a situation in which it is unusually difficult
for them otherwise to contact employees would appear to further the
policies of the NLRA without significantly imposing on the legiti-
mate interests of employers.
might be able to set forth some presumptions. For example, if it were found that the
use of media advertising did not get the union message to employees in large metro-
politan areas, that "alternative" might be presumed ineffective. Likewise, if an analy-
sis of union organization in large urban centers disclosed that home visits are
impractical and that mailed material does not effectively "reach" the employees, those
channels might also be presumed ineffective in situations where the union possesses
an employee list. At present, since we have no real data as to the relative effectiveness
of the various means of communication, we are engaging in nothing more than specu-
lation by automatically accepting or rejecting any of these methods.
67. NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone), 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
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